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Reliability and Risk Assesment
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Book : Reliability and Risk Assesment Author : * John D. Andrews * T. R. Moss Language : English Library : Health-Safety-Environment Publish Place : Londra ISBN : 1 86058 290 7 Publish Date : January 2002 Publisher : Professional Engineering Publishing Book Type : Book Book Number : 4652 |
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INDEX
Chapter 1 An Introduction to Reliability and RiskAssessment
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Quantified reliability
1.3 Reliability terminology
1.3.1 Reliability
1.3.2 Availability
1.3.3 Unrevealed failures
1.4 Reliability programmes
1.5 Quantified risk assessment
1.5.1 Background
1.5.2 Occupational risks
1.5.3 Community risks
1.6 Risk assessment studies
1.7 Reliability in risk assessment
1.7.1 Fault trees
1.7.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
1.8 Risk ranking
1.9 Summary
1.10 References
Chapter 2 Reliability Mathematics
2.1 Probability theory
2.1.1 Empirical or experimental probability
2.1.2 Sample size
2.1.3 Theoretical probability
2.1.4 Mutually exclusive events
2.1.5 Non-mutually exclusive events
2.1.6 The addition law of probability
2.1.7 Independent events
2.1,8 Dependent events
2.1.9 Multiplication law of probability
2.1.10 Conditional probability
2.1.11 Binomial distribution
2.1.12 Poisson distribution
2.1.13 Continuous probability distributions
2.1.14 Normal distribution
2.1.15 Log-normal distribution
2.1.16 Negative exponential distribution
2.1.17 Weibull distribution
2.2 Set theory
2.2.1 Notation
2.2.2 Venn diagrams
2.2.3 Operations on a set
2.2.4 Probability and Venn diagrams
2.3 Boolean algebra
2.3.1 AORB
2.3.2 AANDB
2.3.3 NOT .4
2.3.4 Rules of Boolean algebra
2.4 Summary
2.5 Bibliography
Chapter 3 Qualitative Methods
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Hazard analysis
3.3 Checklists
3.4 Hazard and operability studies
3.4.1 HAZOP methodology
3.4.2 The HAZOP team
3.4.3 The HAZOP study
3.5 Rapid ranking
3.6 Preliminary hazard analysis
3.7 Reliability and maintainability screening
3.8 Summary
3.9 References
Chapter 4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Procedure for performing an FMEA/FMECA
4.2.1 System definition
4.2.2 Block diagrams
4.2.3 Assumptions
4.2.4 Reliability data
4.2.5 FMEA worksheets
4.3 Criticality analysis
4.4 Functional and hardware FMEA/FMECA examples
4.4.1 General
4.4.2 System definition
4.4.3 Block diagrams
4.4.4 Assumptions
4.4.5 Reliability data
4.4.6 Functional FMEA/FMECA worksheets
4.5 Multi-criteria Pareto ranking
4.6 Common cause screening
4.7 Matrix method
4.8 Risk priority number method of FMECA
4.9 Fuzzy logic prioritization of failures
4.10 Generic parts count
4.11 Summary
4.12 References
Chapter 5 Quantification of Component Failure Probabilities
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Availability
5.1.2 Reliability
5.2 The failure process
5.2.1 Mean time to failure
5.2.2 Failure data example
5.3 The repair process
5.4 The whole failure/repair process
5.4.1 Component performance parameters
5.5 Calculating unconditional failure and repair
intensities
5.5.1 Epected number of failures and repairs
5.5.2 Unavailability
5.6 Maintenance policies
5.7 Failure and repair distribution with non-constant
hazard rates
5.7.1 Method 1
5.7.1 Method 2
5.8 Weibull analysis
5.8.1 Introduction
5.8.2 The Weibull distribution
5.8.3 Graphical analysis
5.8.4 Censored samples
5.8.5 Probability plotting
5.8.6 Hazard plotting
5.8.7 Standard deviation
5.9 Summary
5.10 References
5.11 Bibliography
Chapter 6 Reliability Networks
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Simple network structures
6.2.1 Series networks
6.2.2 Parallel networks
6.2.3 Series/parallel combinations
6.2.4 Voting systems
6.2.5 Standby systems
6.3 Complex networks
6.3.1 Conditional probability approach
6.3.2 Star and delta configurations
6.4 Network failure modes
6.4.1 Minimal path sets using the connectivity matrix
6.4.2 Transform minimal path sets to minimal
cut sets
6.5 Network quantification
6.5.1 Minimal cut set calculations
6.5.2 Minimal path set calculations
6.6 Summary
6.7 Bibliography
Chapter 7 Fault Tree Analysis
7.1 The fault tree model
7.2 Examples of the use of fault tree symbols
7.3 Boolean representation of a fault tree
7.4 Component failure categories
7.4.1 Fault versus failures
7.4.2 Occurrence versus existence
7.4.3 Passive versus active components
7.5 Fault tree construction
7.5.1 System boundary specification
7.5.2 Basic rules for fault tree construction
7.6 Qualitative fault tree analysis
7.6.1 'Top-down' approach
7.6.2 'Bottom-up' approach
7.6.3 Computer algorithm
7.6.4 Minimal path sets and dual fault trees
7.7 Fault tree quantification
7.7.1 Top event probability
7.7.2 Top event failure intensity
7.7.3 Minimal cut set parameters
7.7.4 Calculating system unconditional failure intensity using initiator/enabler events
7.8 Importance measures
7.8.1 Deterministic measures
7.8.2 Probabilistic measures (systems
availability)
7.8.3 Birnbaum's measure of importance
7.8.4 Criticality measure of importance
7.8.5 Fussell-Vesely measure of importance
7.8.6 Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance
7.8.7 Probabilistic measures (systems reliability)
7.8.8 Barlow-Proschan measure of initiator importance
7.8.9 Sequential contributory measure of enabler importance
7.8.10 Barlow-Proschan measure of minimal cut
set importance
7.9 Expected number of system failures as a bound for systems unreliability
7.10 Use of system performance measures
7.11 Benefits to be gained from fault tree analysis
7.12 Summary
7.13 Bibliography
Chapter 8 Common Cause Failures
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Common mode and common cause failures
8.2.1 Common mode cut sets
8.2.2 The beta factor method
8.3 Other common cause failure models
8.4 Choice of CCF model
8.4.1 Redundancy and diversity
8.4.2 System complexity
8.4.3 Defences against CCF
8.4.4 Unrevealed failures
8.5 Fault tree analysis with CCF
8.6 Summary
8.7 References
Chapter 9 Maintainability
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Maintainability analysis
9.3 The maintainability model
9.4 Maintainability prediction
9.4.1 Field data analysis
9.5 MTTR synthesis
9.6 Summary
9.7 Reference
Chapter 10 Markov Analysis
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 Standby redundancy
10.1.2 Common causes
10.1.3 Secondary failures
10.1.4 Multiple-state component failure modes
10.2 Example - single-component failure/repair process
10.3 General Markov state transition model construction
10.4 Markov state equations 10.4.1 State equations
10.5 Dynamic solutions
10.6 Steady-state probabilities,
10.7 Standby systems
10.7.1 Hot standby
10.7.2 Cold standby
10.7.3 W arm standby
10.8 Reduced Markov diagrams 10.8.1 Steady-state solutions
10.9 General three-component system
10.10 Time duration in states
10.10.1 Frequency of encountering a state
10.11 Transient solutions
10.12 Reliability modelling
10.13 Summary
10.14 Bibliography
Chapter 11 Simulation
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Uniform random numbers
11.3 Direct simulation method
11.4 Dagger sampling
11.5 Generation of event times from distributions
11.5.1 Exponential distribution
11.5.2 Weibull distribution
11.5.3 Normal distribution
11.6 System logic
11.7 System example
11.8 Terminating the simulation
11.9 Summary
11.10 Bibliography
Chapter 12 Reliability Data Collection and Analysis
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Generic data
12.3 In-service reliability data
12.4 Data collection
12.4.1 General
12.4.2 Inventory data
12.4.3 Failure-event data
12.4.4 Operating time data
12.5 Data quality assurance
12.5.1 Quality plan
12.6 Reliability data analysis
12.6.1 General
12.6.2 Component reliability
12.6.3 Equipment reliability
12.6.4 System reliability
12.6.5 In-service data reliability
12.6.6 System level analysis
12.6.7 Equipment level analysis
12.6.8 Trend analysis
12.7 Generic reliability data analysis
12.7.1 Estimating equipment failure rates
12.7.2 Genenc reliability database
12.8 Summary
12.9 References
Chapter 13 Risk Assessment
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Background
13.3 Major accident hazards
13.3.1 Explosions
13.3.2 Gas and dust explosions
13.3.3 Confined and unconfined vapour cloud
explosions
13.3.4 Fires
13.3.5 Toxic releases
13.4 Major accident hazard risk assessments
13.4.1 Hazard identification
13.4.2 Consequence analysis
13.4.3 Estimating event probabilities
13.4.4 Risk evaluation
13.5 Risk-based inspection and maintenance
13.5.1 General
13.5.2 Risk-based inspection
13.5.3 Comparison of RBI and major accident
hazard assessments
13.5.4 RBI assessment
13.5.5 API RBI assessment methodology
13.5.6 Experience with RBI
13.6 Summary
13.7 References
Chapter 14 Case study 1 - Quantitative safety assessment of the ventilation recirculation system in an undersea mine
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Recirculation fan system description
14.3 Conditions for fan stoppage
14.3.1 Methane levels
14.3.2 Carbon monoxide levels
14.3.3 Recirculation factor
14.3.4 Additional monitoring
14.4 Scope of the analysis
14.5 System description
14.5.1 Section switch trip protection
14.6 Fault tree construction
14.6.1 Dormant or unrevealed system failure
14.6.2 Spurious or revealed system trip
14.7 Qualitative fault tree analysis of the system
14.7.1 Dormant or unrevealed system failure modes
14.7.2 Spurious or revealed system failure modes
14.8 Component failure and repair data
14.8.1 Component failure rate data
14.8.2 Carbon monoxide monitors
14.8.3 Pressure monitors
14.8.4 Methane monitors
14.8.5 Component repair data
14.9 Quantitative system analysis
14.9.1 System unavailability
14.9.2 Unconditional failure intensity
14.9.3 Spurious recirculation fan stoppages
14.10 Performance of the methane and carbon monoxide monitoring systems
14.11 Variations in system design and operation
14.11.1 Design changes
14.11.2 Inspection interval changes
14.11.3 Methane detection system
14.11.4 Carbon monoxide detection system
14.12 Conclusions
Chapter 14 Case study 2 - Failure mode and effects criticality analysis of gas turbine system
14.13 Introduction
14.14 Gas turbine FMECA
14.15 Discussion
14.16 Summary
Chapter 14 Case study 3 - In-service inspection of structural components (application to conditional maintenance of steam generators)
14.17 Introduction
14.18 Data needed for safety and maintenance objectives
14.19 The steam generator maintenance programme
14.20 Expected benefits of the probabilistic ISI base programme
14.21 Data for safety and data for maintenance
14.22 The probabilistic fracture mechanics model
14.23 Safety and maintenance-orientated results 14.23.1 Developing the preventive maintenance
strategy
14.23.2 Evolution of the crack size distnbution with time
14.23.3 Determination of future leak and rupture risks
14.23.4 Determination of steam generator residual life - strategy for SG replacement
14.24 Sensitivity analysis
14.24.1 Comparison between probabilistic and deterministic models
14.24.2 Impact of plugging criteria - data for plant safety strategy
14.24.3 Influence of the rate of controlled tube inspections - data for maintenance strategy
14.25 Conclusions
Chapter 14 Case study 4 - Business-interruption risk analysis
14.26 Introduction
14.27 Risk assessment
14.28 Combined-cycle plant assessment
14.29 Data and basic assumptions
14.30 Plant availability prediction
14.31 Risk estimation
14.32 Conclusions
14.33 References
Appendix A Appendix B Glossary Index
